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Abstract
In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) 
when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern 
consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure 
have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing 
null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed 
the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered 
replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis 
used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an 
intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay 
condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage 
points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the 
original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 
percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In 
combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of 
selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.
Keywords
cooperation, social heuristic hypothesis, decision making, economic games, social psychology, replication
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Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012) argued that our social 
intuitions are shaped by our daily experiences and that 
those intuitions can determine whether our default 
response is selfish or cooperative. According to this social 
heuristic hypothesis (formalized mathematically by Bear 
& Rand, 2016; but see Myrseth & Wollbrant, 2016), peo-
ple who regularly experience and benefit from coopera-
tion in their daily lives will tend to develop cooperative 
intuitions as a default response, and those who are 
rewarded for non-cooperation will tend toward selfish 
intuitive responses. Although intuitions vary across peo-
ple, deliberation is theorized to always favor self-interested 
behavior. For example, in one-shot, anonymous economic 
games in which selfish actions maximize one’s payoff 
deliberation will favor non-cooperation, overriding any 
potential intuitive bias toward cooperation. The social 
heuristic hypothesis predicts more cooperation for judg-
ments made intuitively (because some participants will 
default to cooperative responses) than when judgments 
are made with more deliberation (because deliberation 
will favor selfishness for all participants).
Rand and colleagues (2012) conducted a series of 
studies to assess the social heuristics hypothesis, using 
correlational quasi-experimental and experimental designs. 
Two of these experiments manipulated time pressure in 
a one-shot public goods game, with one testing partici-
pants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (Study 6) and 
another testing college students in a lab (Study 7). In 
these experiments, participants were either required to 
decide how much to contribute to the group within 10 s 
(time-pressure condition/intuitive decision making), or 
they were asked to wait at least 10 s before deciding on 
their contribution (forced-delay condition/reflection). In 
both experiments, when noncompliant participants were 
removed prior to analysis, the mean contribution was 
greater in the intuition/time-pressure condition than in 
the reflection/forced-delay condition. However, when 
including all participants in an intent-to-treat analysis—
thereby preserving random assignment to conditions and 
avoiding selection biases—the contributions did not differ 
significantly between conditions in either experiment 
(Tinghög et al., 2013; they did differ significantly when com-
bining across the two studies: Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2013).
Since its publication, Rand et al.’s (2012) article has 
been highly influential. Yet, some studies have not found 
a difference in cooperation between participants placed 
under time pressure and those forced to delay their deci-
sion (Lohse, 2016; Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & 
Bouwmeester, 2014). A recent meta-analysis of 51 pub-
lished and unpublished studies (Rand, 2016; N = 15,850; 
the included studies showed no evidence of publication 
bias using p curve or Egger’s test) testing different ways 
to induce intuition/deliberation in one-shot economic 
cooperation games reported a positive link between intu-
ition and cooperation for the subset of studies in which 
defection always maximizes payoff (as in Rand et al., 
2012 and in the unsuccessful replications cited earlier). 
However, the meta-analysis also showed a great deal of 
heterogeneity across studies, and many studies did not 
find a significant effect when considered individually.
One potentially critical issue involves how the analy-
ses account for participants who did not comply with the 
time-pressure instructions (Tinghög et al., 2013). In most 
studies using the time-pressure and forced-delay proce-
dure, many participants in the time-pressure condition 
respond too slowly (a substantially smaller proportion 
fail to respond slowly enough in the forced-delay condi-
tion). Rand et al. (2012) restricted their analysis to par-
ticipants who had adhered to the task instructions (a 
compliant-only analysis; an approach adopted by others, 
e.g., Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014) rather than ana-
lyzing all participants assigned to each condition (an 
intent-to-treat analysis). Given the high exclusion rates 
and that compliance means different things in the two 
conditions (i.e., too fast in one condition and too slow in 
the other), a compliant-only analysis can introduce sys-
tematic differences between the participants in each con-
dition. For example, a compliant-only analysis might 
selectively eliminate slow-responding participants from 
the time-pressure condition and not from the forced-
delay condition, thereby disrupting random assignment 
to conditions. Such selective exclusion could produce a 
spurious difference between conditions that is driven by 
selection bias (i.e., differences between the participants) 
rather than by the experimental intervention.
Consistent with this possibility, correlational studies 
have found a negative correlation between response time 
and cooperation (Rand et al., 2012). Consequently, 
excluding slow respondents would be expected to intro-
duce a bias favoring greater cooperation among the 
remaining participants in the time-pressure condition; of 
those randomly assigned to the time-pressure condition, 
the compliant-only participants are more likely to be fast 
responding and more cooperative. Given that about 50% 
of the participants in Rand et al. (2012) failed to respond 
on time, selection biases could partly explain the differ-
ence between conditions in the compliant-only analysis.
In contrast, an intent-to-treat analysis preserves ran-
dom assignment because all people assigned to each 
condition are included in the analysis regardless of 
whether they adhered to the instructions. Consequently, 
it permits a valid causal inference about the generality of 
any observed difference between the conditions. How-
ever, an intent-to-treat analysis does not always allow a 
clear inference about the effectiveness of the treatment 
itself. It gives an unbiased estimate of the direction of the 
effect, but it can underestimate the potency of a treatment 
if some participants fail to adhere to the instructions. For 
example, if no participants adhered to the instructions, an 
intent-to-treat analysis would show no effect (the participants 
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in the two conditions essentially did the same thing 
because none of them followed instructions). But, it 
would not test whether time pressure would have been 
effective had participants in each condition actually fol-
lowed the instructions. An intent-to-treat analysis tests 
whether there is a difference between people who were 
instructed to respond quickly and those who were 
instructed to respond after a delay, regardless of whether 
they actually adhered to those instructions.
For this Registered Replication Report (RRR), we use 
an intent-to-treat analysis as our primary analysis because 
it does not undermine random assignment to conditions 
and thereby allows for an unbiased causal inference. 
Given that the original study analyzed the data by exclud-
ing noncompliant participants, our protocol specified 
that we too would do this analysis if more than 10% of 
participants failed to comply with the time constraints.
In addition to these analyses, we conducted explor-
atory analyses that excluded participants with prior expe-
rience in tasks of this sort or who failed to comprehend 
the task. Participants who had previous experience with 
economic games of this sort may have learned that their 
intuitions can lead them astray in one-shot games and 
thus have been less likely to show the intuitive coopera-
tion effect (Rand et al., 2012, 2014; Rand & Kraft-Todd, 
2014). Also, participants who mistakenly believed that 
cooperation maximized payoff (i.e., those who did not 
comprehend the nature of the task) would have been more 
likely to cooperate even with deliberation (Strømland, 
Tjøtta, & Torsvik, 2016). In the analyses, we report the dif-
ference between the time-pressure and forced-delay con-
ditions with and without these participants.
In summary, the goal of this RRR is to shed further light 
on the link between intuition and cooperation by assess-
ing the size and variability of the difference in coopera-
tion between participants responding under time pressure 
and those responding after a delay. More specifically, the 
RRR will replicate the between-subjects comparison (time 
pressure vs. forced delay) from Study 7 of Rand et al.’s 
(2012) study in a laboratory setting with college students 
as participants. The primary planned analysis includes all 
participants who met the protocol requirements and com-
pleted the task. The secondary analyses examine how the 
difference between conditions varies when excluding 
participants who have had prior experience with tasks 
like this one, who fail comprehension checks, and who 
do not comply with the task requirements (other explor-
atory moderator analyses, including individualism vs. col-
lectivism, are reported at https://osf.io/scu2f/).
Protocol and Participating Laboratories
The protocol for a replication of Study 7 from Rand et al. 
(2012) was developed by Samantha Bouwmeester and 
Peter Verkoeijen. The original study’s first author, David 
Rand, provided extensive input and guidance throughout 
the process, including the original materials and scripts. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science publicly announced 
a call for laboratories interested in participating in the 
RRR project on June 8, 2015, and after the July 6, 2015, 
deadline, 23 laboratories were accepted to join the proj-
ect. Twenty-one laboratories completed the study, col-
lecting enough data to meet the inclusion criteria. The 
final set of replications included studies from a range of 
institutions across 12 countries, with many participating 
laboratories headed by experts on decision making, pub-
lic good games, and/or social psychology. Each labora-
tory preregistered their plans for implementing the 
approved protocol, and these plans were preapproved 
by the editor, who verified that they met all of the require-
ments for the study. The results from all completed stud-
ies are included in this report, regardless of their 
outcome.
The protocol specified minimum sample sizes, exclu-
sion rules, and testing conditions, and each laboratory’s 
preregistered implementation of the protocol specified 
their target and minimum sample size, testing setting, 
recruiting procedures, and other aspects of their imple-
mentation. All labs used the same experimental script for 
data collection, modifying it only when it was necessary 
to translate materials to languages other than English. 
The full protocol is available on the Open Science Frame-
work (https://osf.io/scu2f/) and that project page includes 
links to each participating laboratory’s implementation of 
the study.
Method
Subjects
The protocol required testing of at least 75 participants in 
each of the two conditions, and labs were strongly encour-
aged to test as large a sample as possible. With the mini-
mum sample size, individual studies would be underpowered 
to reject the null hypothesis for the original sample size, but 
the goal of the RRR is not to determine whether each indi-
vidual study obtains a statistically significant result. Rather, 
the goal is to estimate the effect size meta-analytically across 
studies. Consequently, these projects trade off power in 
individual studies against the desire to increase the number 
of participating laboratories.
Participants were between the ages of 18 and 34 and 
were recruited from undergraduate subject pools or the 
equivalent; each sample ranged between 20% and 80% 
women. Participants received a show-up payment or 
course credit for participating, and they also had an 
opportunity to earn more money as a result of a public 
goods game (see below). The show-up fees varied some-
what across laboratories depending on their typical pay-
ments for studies of this sort. For recruiting purposes, the 
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study was described as a “study of decision making,” and 
other than the duration, location, and compensation, no 
other information was provided about the content of the 
study. In order to increase the likelihood that participants 
would be unfamiliar with studies of this sort, laboratories 
were encouraged to collect their data at the start of the 
semester and to recruit from student samples with less 
experience in psychology studies. The protocol also 
asked laboratories to collect data on prior study experi-
ence for each participant.
Given the design of the study, participants were tested 
in groups that were multiples of 4, with a minimum test-
ing session size of 12 participants. In rare cases, when 
fewer than 12 participants attended a scheduled session, 
data from groups with 8 participants were permitted. 
Whenever the total number of participants to attend a 
session was not a multiple of 4, the extra participants 
were paid a “show up” fee and were not tested (or were 
asked to return for a later session). The minimum group 
size ensured that participants believed the explanation 
that the payoff depended on other people and that they 
could not determine which of the other people in the 
room were in their group.
Materials & procedures
The original study materials, including the instructions, 
scripts, and post-experiment questionnaires were con-
verted into a Qualtrics script (http://www.qualtrics.com) 
that handled all data collection. The script is available at 
https://osf.io/scu2f/. Labs conducting testing in countries 
other than the United States and Canada translated the 
contents of the script and adapted the currency amounts 
to match a similar level of local purchasing power (see 
http://www.numbeo.com/cost-of-living/compare_coun 
tries.jsp). These translated Qualtrics scripts are available 
on each lab’s project page.
The Qualtrics script randomly assigned participants to 
a time-pressure condition and a forced-delay condition, 
with the constraint that approximately equal numbers of 
participants would be assigned to each condition. The 
experimenter and other participants were blind to condi-
tion assignment, and participants were unaware of the 
existence of a condition different from their own. The 
Qualtrics script showed the following instructions to all 
participants:
You have been randomly assigned to interact with 
3 of the other people in the room. All of you receive 
this same set of instructions. You cannot participate 
in this study more than once. Each person in your 
group is given $4 for this interaction. You each 
decide how much of your $4 to keep for yourself, 
and how much (if any) to contribute to the group’s 
common project (from 0 to 400 cents). All money 
contributed to the common project is doubled, and 
then split evenly among the 4 group members. 
Thus, for every 2 cents contributed to the common 
project, each group member receives 1 cent. If 
everyone contributes all of their $4, everyone’s 
money will double: each of you will earn $8. But if 
everyone else contributes their $4, while you keep 
your $4, you will earn $10, while the others will 
earn only $6. That is because for every 2 cents you 
contribute, you get only 1 cent back. Thus you 
personally lose money on contributing. The other 
people really will make this decision too—there is 
no deception in this study. Once you and the other 
people have chosen how much to contribute, the 
interaction is over. None of you can affect each 
other’s payoffs other than through the single 
decision in this interaction.
On the next screen, participants were asked to decide 
how much to contribute by using a slider, with a pointer 
that started in the center of the range and with several 
values marked (the starting position was not marked with 
a value). When participants moved the slider, it indicated 
the exact contribution for that slider position. Although 
the slider did not require a response, in order to select an 
exact contribution, participants needed to move the 
slider. If they pressed continue without moving the slider, 
their contribution was recorded as missing and their data 
were excluded from the analyses.
Participants in the time-pressure condition were told: 
“Please make your decision as quickly as possible. You 
must make your decision in less than 10 seconds!” The 
screen showed a timer that counted down from 10, stop-
ping at zero. Participants in the forced-delay condition 
were told: “Please carefully consider you [sic] decision. 
You must wait and think for at least 10 seconds before 
making your decision!”1 The screen showed a timer that 
counted up from 0 and continued counting until the par-
ticipant responded. The script recorded each participant’s 
contribution and the time when they submitted their 
decision. Note that the original study did not use timers; 
during protocol development, David Rand suggested 
adding them based on his experience from subsequent 
studies.
After their decision, participants answered questions 
and surveys to measure (a) comprehension of the task; 
(b) their justification for their contribution; (c) individual-
ism or collectivism (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 
1995); (d) experience with tasks of this sort; (e) experi-
ence with research participation more generally; (f) self-
reported perceptions of trust in others (a factor suggested 
by Rand as a possible moderator of the time-pressure 
effect); (g) awareness of the research hypothesis (PARH: 
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cf. Rubin, Paolini, & Crisp, 2010); (h) sex, birth year, and 
country; and (i) how many of the participants in the 
room they knew.
As in the original study, participants were paid by ran-
domly grouping them with 3 other participants (without 
replacement) to determine the collective group contribu-
tion and payout amounts.
Data exclusions
Data were excluded for participants who were younger 
than 18 or older than 34 (determined by subtracting their 
self-reported birth year from 2015; participants who did 
not report their birth year were excluded), who did not 
complete all tasks, or who did not move the slider to 
select a specific contribution amount; data was also 
excluded when the experimenter/computer incorrectly 
administered the task or instructions. Exclusion decisions 
that depended on a judgment of an experimenter were 
made by someone blind to condition assignment and 
before examining that participant’s contribution in the 
public goods task. All data, including those from excluded 
participants, are provided on each laboratory’s Open Sci-
ence Framework page and on the main page for the RRR. 
Secondary meta-analyses report the results when exclud-
ing participants who had experience with studies like 
this one (experience), who did not adhere to the time 
constraints (noncompliant), or who did not correctly 
answer the comprehension check questions (noncom-
prehending). The experience analysis included only 
those participants who responded with a “1—nothing 
like this scenario” to the question: “To what extent have 
you participated in studies like this one before? (i.e. 
where you choose how much to keep for yourself versus 
contributing to benefit others).”
Results
A total of 21 laboratories contributed data from a grand 
total of 3,596 participants. Table 1 presents sample demo-
graphics for each participating laboratory. The Appendix 
provides a brief description of each laboratory’s study, 
including documentation of any departures from the offi-
cial protocol or from their own preregistered plans.
Primary analysis
Given that labs varied in the currency used to pay partici-
pants, we calculated each person’s contribution as a per-
centage of the maximum possible contribution. For each 
lab, we then computed the mean percentage contribution 
in the time-pressure and forced-delay conditions and the 
difference in means between them (pressure – delay).
The primary analysis includes all participants who met 
the protocol requirements and recorded a contribution 
(an intent-to-treat analysis). Figure 1 shows a forest plot 
and the results of a random-effects meta-analysis across 
all laboratories. Below that meta-analysis, it also provides 
the meta-analytic result when excluding experienced 
(n = 2,000 in the analysis), noncompliant (n = 2,276), or 
noncomprehending (n = 2,304) participants, and when 
excluding all three (n = 792). Table 2 summarizes the 
results for each laboratory separately for all participants 
and after applying the exclusion criteria.2
An intent-to-treat analysis of data from the original 
study showed an 8.6 [95% CI: −1.84, 19.00] percentage 
point difference in the amount contributed between the 
time-pressure (M = 49.4%) and forced-delay (M = 40.8%) 
conditions.3 Across all participants, the meta-analytic 
effect size in the RRR was −0.37 percentage points [95% 
CI: −2.60, 1.86], a value smaller than observed in the orig-
inal data and close to zero. The observed effects ranged 
from −9.36 to 7.87, and the variability across laboratories 
was consistent with what would be expected by chance, 
Q(20) =16.84, p = .66, I2 = 2.72%.
Analyses with data exclusions
The preregistered protocol specified that if more than 
10% of participants failed to adhere to the time con-
straints, we would conduct a secondary analysis includ-
ing only on those participants who complied with the 
time constraints (a compliant-only analysis; 34.1% and 
92.5% compliance in the time-pressure and forced-delay 
conditions respectively). In this analysis, the meta-ana-
lytic difference between conditions was 10.37 percentage 
points compared with a 15.31 percentage point differ-
ence for the same analysis in the original study. The vari-
ability across laboratories was somewhat larger but not 
significantly different from what would be expected by 
chance, Q(20) = 29.22, p = .084, I 2 = 33.04%.
The results of the meta-analyses excluding participants 
based on their experience or comprehension were simi-
lar to those of the primary meta-analysis that included all 
participants, with meta-analytical differences of −2.19 
percentage points and −0.64 percentage points, respec-
tively. The variability across labs again was consistent 
with what would be expected by chance: experienced 
Q(20) = 25.31, p = .19, I 2 = 19.08%; noncomprehending 
Q(20) = 14.93, p = .78, I 2 = 8.06%. Furthermore, when 
applying all three of these exclusion criteria (experience, 
noncompliance, and nonunderstanding), the meta-ana-
lytic difference between conditions was 12.34 percentage 
points, with cross-lab variability consistent with what 
would be expected by chance alone, Q(18) = 15.20, p = 
.65, I 2 = 0.94%.
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Fig. 1. Forest plot and meta-analytic result for the difference in contributions between the time-pressure and forced-delay conditions. Studies in 
the forest plot are listed alphabetically by the last name of the first author for that lab’s study with the original result presented at the top. The mean 
difference for each lab is indicated by a square with the size corresponding to the inverse of the standard error of the difference score for that lab. 
The error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around that laboratory’s mean difference. The diamonds in the Summary section represent the 
results of random-effects meta-analyses of the RRR studies with the width representing a 95% confidence interval around the meta-analytic differ-
ence. None of these meta-analyses includes the original Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012) result. The first diamond corresponds to the data in the 
forest plot and represents the primary planned meta-analysis with all participants. The next three diamonds show the meta-analytic difference after 
excluding experienced, noncompliant, or noncomprehending participants. The final diamond provides the meta-analytic difference when excluding 
participants who failed to meet any one of these criteria. A forest plot for the data excluding noncompliant participants is provided in the General 
Discussion section. Forest plots for the other meta-analyses are available at https://osf.io/scu2f/. 
Additional exploratory analyses examined the role of 
a number of other moderators, including trust in others, 
gender, age, individualism or collectivism, whether or not 
participants knew other participants, total studies partici-
pated in previously, and participation in deceptive stud-
ies. The results of these meta-analyses are presented in 
Table 3, and the associated forest plots are available at 
https://osf.io/scu2f/.
General Discussion
This RRR featured data from 21 laboratories and a total of 
3,596 participants. The studies were conducted according 
to a vetted design, and the analysis scripts were created 
while blind to the actual outcomes of the studies 
(although they were updated to address formatting 
issues, to provide more complete output, and to correct 
errors). The primary planned analysis in the RRR—an 
intent-to-treat approach including all participants—
revealed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percent-
age points between the time-pressure condition and the 
forced-delay condition. This meta-analytic result is close 
to zero and smaller than the 8.6 percentage point differ-
ence computed from the original data. However, analyz-
ing the data in the same way that the original article 
did—a compliant-only analysis that excludes participants 
who did not adhere to the time constraints—revealed a 
difference in contributions between conditions of 10.37 
percentage points compared with a difference of 15.31 
percentage points in the original study (see Fig. 2). The 
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Table 2. Decision Times, Contributions, and Sample Sizes in Each Lab, Shown With and Without Exclusions
Time pressure Forced delay
Lab Condition N
Decision time
M (SD)
Contribution
M (SD) N
Decision time
M (SD)
Contribution
M (SD)
Aczel All participants 101 13.9 (5.4) 85.7 (20.8) 102 26.5 (11) 80.2 (26.5)
 Excluding experienced 82 14.2 (5.4) 87.4 (19) 87 26.3 (10.9) 81.2 (26.9)
 Excluding noncompliant 20         8 (0.9) 96.2 (10.1) 99 27.1 (10.7) 80.6 (25.5)
 Excluding noncomprehending 58 12.8 (4.3) 92.1 (15.3) 58 26.9 (10) 84.7 (22.5)
 Any exclusion 7 7.8 (0.6) 97.4 (6.9) 49     27 (10.5) 86.8 (21.3)
Bègue All participants 107 14.7 (6.7) 64.3 (38.1) 114 33.5 (24.9) 64.6 (35.1)
 Excluding experienced 86 14.3 (6.7) 65.1 (38.9) 97 33.2 (21.7) 63.2 (37)
 Excluding noncompliant 25 8.3 (1.4) 86.5 (29.6) 109 34.7 (24.8) 63.6 (35.1)
 Excluding noncomprehending 65      14 (5.5) 66.7 (38.1) 71 35.9 (27.2) 62.7 (38.2)
 Any exclusion 16       8 (1.6) 89.6 (28.5) 59 35.7 (21.3) 60.5 (40.2)
Bouwmeester All participants 87      15 (7.4) 54.3 (36.7) 82 32.6 (24) 58.2 (33.7)
 Excluding experienced 65 15.7 (8) 54.1 (36.5) 63 34.8 (26.5) 58.6 (34.8)
 Excluding noncompliant 15 7.4 (2) 69.2 (45.5) 80 33.2 (24) 58.4 (33.1)
 Excluding noncomprehending 67 15.4 (7.9) 56.1 (37.7) 58 34.4 (26.8) 58.7 (32.7)
 Any exclusion 6        7 (2.4) 83.3 (40.8) 43 37.7 (29.9) 58.2 (34.4)
Espín All participants 77 12.7 (7.3)     55 (38.1) 80 24.2 (12.7) 57.2 (35.6)
 Excluding experienced 39 14.4 (9.5) 53.4 (42.8) 43 26.5 (13.6) 61.1 (33.9)
 Excluding noncompliant 31 7.9 (1.7) 68.8 (38) 71 26.3 (11.9) 55.6 (34.6)
 Excluding noncomprehending 29 12.3 (7.2) 52.6 (40.7) 32 23.3 (14.3) 57.8 (38.4)
 Any exclusion 8 7.8 (1) 64.8 (48.9) 15 32.7 (15.1) 51.1 (33.2)
Evans All participants 72 15.3 (8.7)     59 (35.2) 72 32.4 (16.7) 61.6 (29.6)
 Excluding experienced 19 13.2 (4.8) 54.2 (39) 22 32.1 (19.7)     54 (30.1)
 Excluding noncompliant 23       8 (1.8) 71.3 (38.6) 72 32.4 (16.7) 61.6 (29.6)
 Excluding noncomprehending 60      16 (8.9) 56.8 (35) 58 32.5 (17.3) 60.5 (29.1)
 Any exclusion 5 8.3 (1) 60.1 (42.4) 18 33.7 (21.4) 52.6 (32.5)
Ferreira-Santos All participants 81 13.8 (10) 61.5 (28.5) 82 24.7 (15.1) 60.3 (34)
Excluding experienced 57 12.9 (5.8)     61 (29.7) 61 23.9 (10.8) 58.7 (33.8)
 Excluding noncompliant 22 8.3 (1.7) 76.8 (27.1) 78 25.6 (15) 59.7 (33.7)
 Excluding noncomprehending 43 13.4 (6.6) 67.9 (25.3) 36 25.2 (18.2) 62.1 (36.5)
 Any exclusion 8 8.1 (2) 79.4 (26.5) 28 23.9 (6.9) 60.4 (36.8)
Fiedler All participants 79 12.2 (4.9) 74.0 (32.7) 75 27.6 (15.9) 66.2 (39.3)
 Excluding experienced 54 11.7 (4.5) 75.6 (31.5) 48 29.4 (16.4) 67.4 (38.4)
 Excluding noncompliant 31 7.5 (1.7) 92.4 (20.8) 68 29.8 (15.1) 62.7 (39.6)
 Excluding noncomprehending 58 12.7 (5.2) 74.2 (34.6) 53 28.0 (16.9) 69.5 (37.7)
 Any exclusion 15 7.4 (1.6) 89.8 (27.2) 33 30.4 (17.1) 70.1 (36.9)
Hauser All participants 84 11.6 (4.5) 52.1 (39.8) 82 24.4 (14.8) 54.1 (41.1)
 Excluding experienced 26 11.8 (4.2) 65.8 (37.3) 35 26.8 (14.5) 56.7 (39.3)
 Excluding noncompliant 38       8 (1.4) 53.3 (42.2) 72     27 (14) 51.9 (39.9)
 Excluding noncomprehending 73 11.7 (4.5)     50 (39.7) 68 23.9 (15.1) 54.7 (41.8)
 Any exclusion 8 7.8 (1.3) 78.8 (36.4) 25 28.8 (14.7) 55.7 (40)
Hernan All participants 90 11.5 (5.1) 47.2 (39.3) 92 27.2 (20) 49.7 (40.2)
 Excluding experienced 9 16.3 (8.3) 51.9 (33.3) 6 35.7 (34.7) 83.3 (27)
 Excluding noncompliant 43 7.5 (1.6) 48.3 (46.7) 88     28 (20) 50.8 (39.7)
 Excluding noncomprehending 60 11.1 (5.6) 45.9 (40.4) 64 28.2 (22.2) 50.2 (38.8)
 Any exclusion 1 7.5 (NA) 100 (NA) 4 36.2 (41)     75 (30.6)
Lohse All participants 76 13.9 (7.8) 54.2 (38.6) 80 27.9 (15.3) 60.3 (33.5)
 Excluding experienced 20 12.7 (6.1) 57.3 (38.1) 26 29.3 (13.9) 55.3 (33.6)
 Excluding noncompliant 25 8.2 (1.4) 62.8 (43.2) 77 28.8 (15) 59.1 (33.5)
 Excluding noncomprehending 49 12.8 (6.7) 55.6 (41.3) 56 30.1 (16.7) 62.2 (35.9)
 Any exclusion 6 8.6 (1.8) 59.1 (48) 15 32.4 (14.3) 57.6 (38.4)
Mischkowski All participants 97 12.2 (4.4) 54.3 (35) 91     22 (10.8) 59.4 (36.3)
 Excluding experienced 29 13.1 (5.2) 57.6 (34) 19     26 (14.1) 73.9 (30.7)
 Excluding noncompliant 29 7.9 (1.8) 60.5 (41.6) 84 23.2 (10.2) 60.2 (35.2)
(Continued)
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Time pressure Forced delay
Lab Condition N
Decision time
M (SD)
Contribution
M (SD) N
Decision time
M (SD)
Contribution
M (SD)
 Excluding noncomprehending 62 12.5 (4.9) 49.3 (37.1) 60 22.3 (10.1) 60.1 (38)
 Any exclusion 3 7.9 (1.5) 72.4 (47.8) 10      25 (9.4) 83.6 (23)
Neal All participants 81      13 (5.9) 74.2 (34.4) 75 30.3 (18.8) 69.3 (39.5)
 Excluding experienced 72 13.1 (5.5) 73.7 (34.7) 64 30.3 (18.9)      71 (38.9)
 Excluding noncompliant 27 7.5 (1.8) 86.6 (30.9) 74 30.6 (18.7) 68.9 (39.6)
 Excluding noncomprehending 47 12.6 (6.4)    74 (36.2) 39 33.1 (21.7) 73.9 (36.5)
 Any exclusion 14 7.4 (1.8) 94.2 (21.6) 33 33.3 (21.1) 72.6 (36.3)
Novakova All participants 101 13.3 (6.3) 67.5 (33) 101 25.8 (18.7)     65 (36.7)
 Excluding experienced 56 12.5 (6.1) 68.9 (30.9) 55 29.4 (20.3)     74 (27.6)
 Excluding noncompliant 36 7.7 (1.6) 77.5 (32.6) 87 28.8 (18.4) 63.5 (35.8)
 Excluding noncomprehending 69 13.2 (6.8) 65.1 (34.6) 75 25.7 (20.1) 63.4 (37.8)
 Any exclusion 18 7.7 (1.6)     69 (38.6) 33 31.7 (22.6) 73.5 (28.2)
Pagà All participants 79 12.2 (5.9) 44.2 (38.8) 78 22.7 (17.2) 49.8 (38.7)
 Excluding experienced 21 12.1 (4.4) 39.4 (29) 27 17.4 (12.5) 57.4 (39.4)
 Excluding noncompliant 37 8.1 (1.5) 44.6 (44) 62 26.9 (17) 50.3 (36.5)
 Excluding noncomprehending 58 12.2 (6) 37.9 (38) 58 25.4 (18.3) 44.1 (37)
 Any exclusion 7 8.2 (1.5) 33.2 (37.8) 11 23.3 (12) 42.4 (35.4)
Piovesan All participants 107 13.1 (6.9) 53.5 (36.2) 109 26.9 (18.8)      61 (39.4)
 Excluding experienced 91 12.9 (6.4) 52.1 (36.2) 83 28.2 (20.1) 61.9 (39)
 Excluding noncompliant 42 7.6 (1.7) 73.3 (35.9) 100 28.7 (18.6)      60 (39)
 Excluding noncomprehending 65 11.7 (5.4) 53.9 (37.8) 57 23.8 (15.1) 61.9 (42.5)
 Any exclusion 26 7.5 (1.8) 71.7 (35.6) 40 26.2 (14.6) 61.2 (42.5)
Salomon All participants 98      12 (5.8) 62.9 (38.3) 100 33.7 (34.2) 63.2 (36.7)
 Excluding experienced 74 12.3 (5.9) 61.8 (38.1) 69 30.3 (24.9) 66.6 (35.6)
 Excluding noncompliant 40 7.6 (1.8) 69.4 (42.6) 91 36.4 (34.6) 59.5 (36.5)
 Excluding noncomprehending 71 11.7 (5.2) 66.7 (37.7) 72 33.9 (27.1) 65.4 (36.8)
 Any exclusion 19 7.2 (1.8)    78 (39.9) 46 34.8 (26.4) 64.4 (36.8)
Srinivasan All participants 88 41.1 (32.6) 58.1 (35.4) 89 42.5 (29.5) 50.6 (36)
 Excluding experienced 26 38.4 (42.9) 53.6 (40.1) 43 35.9 (25) 52.6 (37.4)
 Excluding noncompliant 8 8.1 (2.1)     68 (38) 85 44.2 (29.1) 49.9 (35.7)
 Excluding noncomprehending 20 42.1 (34.7) 65.9 (39.6) 19 32.1 (17.5) 57.5 (42.1)
 Any exclusion 0 NA (NA) NA (NA) 7 31.2 (11.8) 71.1 (36.7)
Tinghög All participants 83      12 (5.3) 65.5 (35.6) 81     30 (24.7) 74.9 (33)
 Excluding experienced 58 11.9 (5.5) 68.8 (33.3) 72     29 (21.5) 75.7 (32.5)
 Excluding noncompliant 35 7.9 (1.9) 66.6 (41.5) 72 32.9 (24.7)      74 (32.9)
 Excluding noncomprehending 54 12.3 (5.5) 68.3 (34.9) 55 34.3 (28.1) 75.7 (33.2)
 Any exclusion 15 8.1 (1.7) 75.3 (36.8) 46 34.5 (23.8)      76 (32.4)
Trueblood All participants 75 12.1 (5.6) 66.7 (33.2) 68 27.7 (13.1) 66.6 (39.8)
 Excluding experienced 57 11.8 (5.1) 70.1 (31.6) 49 28.5 (13.3) 68.6 (39.7)
 Excluding noncompliant 33 7.5 (1.9) 83.1 (31.7) 63 29.3 (12.1) 67.1 (39)
 Excluding noncomprehending 57 11.7 (5.1) 67.1 (36.5) 52     28 (14) 63.9 (42.1)
 Any exclusion 20 7.5 (1.9)     92 (25.5) 36 30.7 (13) 67.6 (40.3)
  
Wills All participants 75 11.8 (4.5) 48.3 (39.3) 72 25.5 (23.4) 49.8 (38)
 Excluding experienced 18 11.8 (3.9) 39.5 (41.3) 15 32.3 (29.8) 63.9 (34)
 Excluding noncompliant 31        8 (1.3) 52.6 (47.4) 66 27.2 (23.8)      47 (36.9)
 Excluding noncomprehending 57 11.4 (3.8) 49.5 (39.5) 48 27.1 (26.7) 49.4 (39.4)
 Any exclusion 5 7.7 (1.5)     60 (54.8) 5 43.9 (46.7)      61 (38.5)
  
Wollbrant All participants 66 11.6 (4.7) 71.2 (35.3) 67 26.8 (23.8)      69 (38)
 Excluding experienced 23 12.5 (6.3) 66.7 (38.4) 34 30.3 (29.8) 74.9 (35.6)
 Excluding noncompliant 27 7.9 (1.6) 80.3 (36.2) 60     29 (24.2)      67 (37.9)
 Excluding noncomprehending 41 11.1 (3.6) 65.5 (38.6) 52     26 (24.6) 70.2 (38.1)
 Any exclusion 6       8 (1.7) 83.3 (40.8) 23 34.3 (34.1) 73.8 (37.4)
Table 2. (Continued)
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larger difference for a compliant-only analysis than for an 
intent-to-treat analysis is consistent with data from the 
original study and with a recent meta-analysis (Rand, 
2016) that reported a 1.3 percentage point difference for 
an intent-to-treat analysis and a 4.3 percentage point dif-
ference for a compliant-only analysis in the subset of 
studies using time pressure to induce intuitive decision 
making.
The lack of a difference between the time-pressure 
and forced-delay conditions in the intent-to-treat analysis 
shows that instructing people to respond quickly or 
slowly had no effect on the amount of their contribution. 
The compliant-only analysis revealed a positive relation-
ship between time pressure and contribution. However, 
this analysis does not allow for a causal inference because 
excluding participants based on their performance in the 
task can introduce a bias among the subjects assigned to 
each group that yields a spurious difference; any bias 
that undermines random assignment precludes a causal 
inference about the effect of time pressure on contribu-
tions. Excluding noncompliant participants could intro-
duce many different forms of bias, and those biases could 
even vary depending on other factors (e.g., whether or 
not cooperation is appealing in that task; Evans, Dillon, 
& Rand, 2015; Krajbich, Bartling, Hare, & Fehr, 2015).
When an intent-to-treat analysis shows no difference, 
the only way that a difference between conditions in a 
compliant-only analysis could be consistent with the 
effectiveness of the treatment would be if those partici-
pants who did not comply actually experienced a causal 
Table 3. Results of the Moderator Meta-Analyses
Moderator Type of analysis Exclusions
Meta-analytic result
(# of labs, value [95% CI], Q, I2)
Trust (lab level) Meta-regression None 21, –3.66 [–8.46, 1.14], 14.89, 2.95%
All 19, –11.66 [–28.64, 5.33], 13.54, 0.59%
Trust (individual) Slope difference None 21, –0.14 [–1.38, 1.09], 14.55, 0.00%
All 19, –3.30 [–7.52, 0.92], 19.18, 13.81%
Age Slope difference None 21, –0.10 [–0.92, 0.72], 14.57, 0.00%
All 19, –1.02 [–3.27, 1.22], 13.62, 0.00%
Horizontal individualism Slope difference None 21, 0.63 [–1.84, 3.09], 17.12, 0.00%
All 19, –1.76 [–8.43, 4.91], 18.25, 2.37%
Vertical individualism Slope difference None 21, 0.43 [–1.11, 1.97], 14.83, 0.00%
All 19, –2.09 [–7.65, 3.47], 26.60, 29.87%
Horizontal collectivism Slope difference None 21, –0.38 [–3.24, 2.49], 27.74, 22.30%
All 19, –0.15 [–10.83, 10.53], 50.35, 61.09%
Vertical collectivism Slope difference None 21, –0.04 [–1.95, 1.87], 14.98, 0.00%
All 19, 1.57 [–6.38, 9.51], 30.55, 21.40%
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) Effect size difference None 21, –3.81 [–10.58, 2.96], 32.39, 38.40%
All 18, –9.60 [–19.01, –0.18], 8.36, 0.00%
Subject pool study experience (0 = no, 1 = yes) Effect size difference None 21, 4.46 [–1.86, 10.78], 25.06, 16.66%
All 18, 7.17 [–4.29, 18.63], 12.00, 0.00%
Paid study experience (0 = no, 1 = yes) Effect size difference None 20, –2.12 [–9.55, 5.31], 24.13, 16.19%
All 12, –2.48 [–32.03, 27.06], 22.28, 53.20%
MTurk pool study experience (0 = no, 1 = yes) Effect size difference None 19, –0.61 [–8.98, 7.77], 15.35, 0.00%
All 8, –8.07 [–34.78, 18.65], 6.25, 0.00%
Know other participants (0 = no, 1 = yes) Effect size difference None 20, –5.46 [–9.41, –1.52], 10.01, 0.00%
All 17, –6.51 [–20.36, 7.34], 15.92, 0.00%
Deception (0 = no, 1 = yes) Effect size difference None
All
20, –0.99 [–6.40, 4.42], 14.73, 0.00%
14, –9.25 [–25.98, 7.47], 10.07, 0.00%
Note: The Trust (lab level) moderator analysis compares the difference between conditions as a function of the mean level of trust for that lab 
using a meta-regression approach. Slope differences were used for continuous moderators (e.g., age), and they reflect the difference in slopes in 
the time-pressure and forced-delay conditions as a function of that moderator. It is conducted at the individual level for each lab, and the result is 
the meta-analytic difference in slopes across labs. Positive values for the meta-analytic result mean that the difference between the time-pressure 
and forced-delay slopes was larger for larger values of the moderator. Effect size differences were used for dichotomous moderators (i.e., gender), 
and they reflect the difference in the effect size for each level of the moderator. The meta-analytic result is the average difference in effect sizes 
across all labs for that analysis. Note, however, that some labs were not included in some analysis if, after exclusions, they had no data for one 
condition. The number of included labs is indicated in the rightmost column. The Exclusions column indicates the results with no exclusions and 
when participants were excluded based on experience, compliance or comprehension.
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Fig. 2. Forest plot for the difference in contributions between the time-pressure and forced-delay conditions after excluding participants who did 
not comply with the time constraints. Studies in the forest plot are listed alphabetically by the last name of the first author for that lab’s study, with 
the original result presented at the top. The mean difference for each lab is indicated by a square with the size corresponding to the inverse of the 
standard error of the difference score for that lab. The error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around that laboratory’s mean difference. The 
diamond represents the results of random-effects meta-analyses of the RRR studies with the width representing a 95% confidence interval around 
the meta-analytic effect size. The meta-analytic effect does not include the original Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012) result. 
induction that resulted in a more extreme effect in the 
opposite direction. In this case those who did not comply 
with the time-pressure instructions would have to have 
experienced a different treatment effect, one that made 
them even more deliberative than those who complied 
with the forced-delay instructions. Although such a pat-
tern is possible in principle, it would require additional 
empirical evidence to demonstrate that causal relation-
ship in the absence of selection biases. It might also 
require adjustments to the social heuristic hypothesis to 
explain why those who did not comply would be more 
likely to deliberate than would those who were in the 
condition designed to induce deliberation. Without such 
evidence, the most straightforward interpretation of the 
pattern of results is that the difference in the compliant-
only analysis resulted from selection biases and that the 
RRR does not provide evidence for an effect of speeded 
versus delayed responses on cooperation.
Conclusion
Overall, the results of the primary analysis in this RRR 
showed essentially no difference in contributions 
between the time-pressure and forced-delay conditions: 
the point estimate was opposite that predicted by the 
hypothesis and was close to zero. A secondary, compli-
ant-only analysis did show an approximately 10.37 per-
centage point difference between conditions (somewhat 
smaller than the original 15.31 percentage point differ-
ence). However, the compliant-only analysis does not 
allow for causal claims about the intervention due to 
potential selection biases.
Given the challenges of interpreting compliant-only 
analyses in the face of substantial exclusions, future stud-
ies of the effect of intuition on cooperation should strive 
to avoid high rates of non-compliance. One possibility 
would be to redesign the time-pressure procedures in 
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such a way that participants can consistently meet the 
time constraints. Given the challenges in doing so and 
the need to define an arbitrary timing threshold between 
intuitive and deliberative judgments (i.e., a 10-s cutoff), it 
might be more productive to test the social heuristic 
hypothesis using other ways of inducing intuitive or 
deliberative processing.
Appendix: Contributing Laboratories
Lead Lab
Samantha Bouwmeester, Erasmus University
Peter P. J. L. Verkoeijen, Erasmus University
OSF page: https://osf.io/xz7jr/
A total of 185 students were recruited from the psychology sub-
ject pool from the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Participants 
received course credits as a show-up fee and were tested in 
groups (group size ranged from 16 to 32 in multiples of 4). 
After protocol-based exclusions, our sample for the analysis 
consisted of 169 students (time pressure n = 87; forced delay 
n = 82). For English speaking students, we used the provided 
English Qualtrics scripts. For the Dutch students, we used the 
provided Qualtrics scripts with two changes: (a) Our study 
materials were translated into Dutch, and (b) participants made 
their contributions in Euros with a maximum contribution for 
each participant of 4€. In all other respects, we followed the 
official protocol.
Contributing Labs
(Alphabetical by last name of first author)
Balazs Aczel, Eotvos Lorand University
Bence Palfi, Eotvos Lorand University
Barnabas Szaszi, Eotvos Lorand University
Aba Szollosi, Eotvos Lorand University
OSF page: https://osf.io/f6jtm/
A total of 204 students (time pressure n = 102; forced delay 
n = 102) were recruited from the psychology subject pool at 
the Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest, Hungary. Participants 
received course credit as show-up fee and were tested in 
groups (group size of 12 in multiples of 4). We used the pro-
vided Qualtrics scripts with two changes: (a) Our study materi-
als were translated into Hungarian, and (b) participants made 
their contributions in Hungarian Forint with a maximum contri-
bution for each participant of 550 HUF. Although we used the 
preregistered instruction, which specified the maximum pos-
sible contribution as 1,100 HUF, we decreased it to 550 HUF 
for the game to reflect the local economic circumstances. In all 
other respects, we followed the official protocol.
Thorsten G. H. Chmura, University of Nottingham
Roberto Hernan-Gonzalez, University of Nottingham
OSF page: https://osf.io/h9gxm/
A total of 192 students (time pressure n = 96; forced delay n = 
96) were recruited from the CRIBS and CEDEX subject pool at 
the University of Nottingham. Participants were paid a show-
up fee of £2.10 and were tested in groups (group size ranged 
from 35 to 40). We used the provided Qualtrics scripts with 
one change: Participants made their contributions in dollars 
and their final earnings were paid in GBP using the following 
exchange rate of $1.00 = £0.70. In all other respects, we fol-
lowed the official protocol. Participants were recruited by offer-
ing a show-up fee of $3 = £2.10.
Antonio M. Espín, Middlesex University
Pablo Brañas-Garza, Middlesex University
Praveen Kujal, Middlesex University.
OSF page: https://osf.io/3auwr/
A total of 161 students (time pressure n = 79; forced delay 
n = 82) were recruited from the subject pool at Middlesex Uni-
versity London. Participants were paid a show-up fee of £5 
and were tested in groups (group size ranged from 12 to 20 in 
multiples of 4). We used the provided Qualtrics scripts with one 
change: Participants made their contributions in GBP, instead of 
USD, with a maximum contribution for each participant of £4. 
In all other respects, we followed the official protocol.
Anthony M. Evans, Tilburg University
Anna E. van ‘t Veer, Leiden University
OSF page: https://osf.io/c765h/
A total of 152 students (time pressure n = 76; forced delay n = 76) 
were recruited from the psychology subject pool at Tilburg Uni-
versity. Participants received 30 min of participation credit and 
were tested in groups (group size ranged from 8 to 12 in mul-
tiples of 4). We used the provided Qualtrics scripts with two 
changes: (a) Our study materials were translated into Dutch, 
and (b) participants made their contributions in Euros with a 
maximum contribution for each participant of 4€. In all other 
respects, we followed the official protocol.
Fernando Ferreira-Santos, University of Porto
Tiago O. Paiva, University of Porto
Eva C. Martins, Maia University Institute ISMAI/CPUP
Carlos Mauro, Catholic University of Portugal
Fernando Barbosa, University of Porto
OSF page: https://osf.io/z6jsu/
A total of 171 students (time pressure n = 85; forced delay 
n = 86) were recruited from the student body of the University 
of Porto, Maia University Institute–ISMAI, and the Catholic Uni-
versity of Portugal, Porto. Participants were paid a show-up fee 
of 2.50€ and were tested in groups (group size ranged from 8 
to 12 in multiples of 4). We used the provided Qualtrics scripts 
with three changes: (a) Our study materials were translated into 
Portuguese, (b) participants made their contributions in Euros 
with a maximum contribution for each participant of 2.00€, and 
(c) before the beginning of the session, one of the researchers 
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entered the computer ID into the Qualtrics survey (because all 
computers share one external Internet IP, making it impossible 
to identify individual entries in Qualtrics); participants did not 
see this question. In all other respects, we followed the official 
protocol.
Susann Fiedler, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective 
Goods
Rima-Maria Rahal, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collec-
tive Goods
Minou Ghaffari, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective 
Goods
OSF page: https://osf.io/hsdf3/
A total of 196 students (time pressure n = 99; forced delay 
n = 97) were recruited from the subject pool of the Max Planck 
DecisionLab. Participants were paid a show-up fee of 5€ and 
were tested in groups (group size ranged from 8 to 12 in mul-
tiples of 4). We used the provided Qualtrics scripts with two 
changes: (a) Our study materials were translated into German, 
and (b) participants made their contributions in Euros with a 
maximum contribution for each participant of 4€. In all other 
respects, we followed the official protocol. After the exclusion 
of students who were not native speakers of German (n = 18), 
those who did not move the slider to provide a contribution 
(n = 5), those who were younger than 18 (n = 5) or older 
than 35 (n = 2), and students of economics and psychology 
(n = 12), our total sample for the analysis consisted of 154 par-
ticipants (time pressure n = 79, forced delay n = 75). Data from 
2 additional participants in the forced-delay condition were not 
included in the analysis due to a coding error that removed 
their age from the data file. The missing information was only 
recovered after the data for the RRR had been finalized. Their 
data are provided on OSF.
Jennifer S. Trueblood, Vanderbilt University
Lisa Guo, University of California, Irvine
OSF page: https://osf.io/3km2q/
A total of 156 students (time pressure n = 78; forced delay 
n = 78) were recruited from the Department of Psychology 
human subject pool at Vanderbilt. Participants were paid a 
show-up fee of $5 USD and were tested in groups (group size 
ranged from 8 to 24 in multiples of 4). We used the provided 
Qualtrics scripts without changes. The lab we used (Wilson 
Hall 120) was an open computer lab without dividers between 
computers (see photo on OSF). However, the computers were 
spaced far apart, and we do not think participants felt observed 
by other participants or the experimenter. The lab could accom-
modate up to 30 participants in one sitting. Although our pre-
registered plan specified that we would recruit at least 160 
participants, we were unable to recruit enough people to meet 
our target sample size before the end of the academic semester, 
ending with a total of 156 participants.
Oliver P. Hauser, Harvard University
OSF page: https://osf.io/5hza7/
A total of 166 students (time pressure n = 84; forced delay 
n = 82) were recruited from the Harvard Decision Science Lab-
oratory subject pool at Harvard University. Participants were 
tested in groups (group size ranged from 12 to 36 in multi-
ples of 4). The provided Qualtrics scripts were used with one 
change: Before the beginning of the session, a research assistant 
entered the computer ID (to help with distributing payments) 
into the Qualtrics survey; participants did not see this question, 
and the remaining part of the study followed the official protocol. 
Although our preregistered plan specified that participants would 
receive a show-up fee of $5, we were unable to recruit enough 
people to meet our target sample size with that method, so 110 
participants were recruited by offering a show-up fee of $8.
Tei Laine, Université Grenoble Alpes, France
Laurent Bègue, Université Grenoble Alpes, France
Anthony Herrero, Université Grenoble Alpes, France
OSF page: https://osf.io/2z4rg/
A total of 223 students (time pressure n = 109; forced delay 
n = 114) were recruited at Université Grenoble Alpes campus. 
Participants were paid a show-up fee of 5€ and were tested in 
groups (group size ranged from 8 to 12 in multiples of 4). We 
used the provided Qualtrics scripts with two changes: (a) Our 
study materials were translated into French and (b) participants 
made their contributions in Euros with a maximum contribution 
for each participant of 4€. In all other respects, we followed the 
official protocol.
Johannes Lohse, University of Birmingham
Timo Goeschl, University of Heidelberg
OSF page: https://osf.io/6xdzp/
A total of 163 students (time pressure n = 81; forced delay 
n = 82) were recruited from the general subject pool of vol-
unteers at the University of Heidelberg “AWI Lab” using Hroot 
(Bock et al., 2012). Participants were paid a show-up fee of 3€ 
and were tested in groups. Group size was either 12 or 16 par-
ticipants, apart from one session in which we had to run with 
8 participants due to no-shows. We used the Qualtrics script 
provided, but with three changes: (a) Our study materials were 
translated into German in accordance with the other German 
labs, (b) participants made their contributions in Euros with a 
maximum contribution for each participant of 4€, and (c) at the 
end of the experiment participants entered a personal code that 
was used to ensure anonymous payment. In all other respects, 
we followed the official protocol.
Dorothee Mischkowski, University of Hagen
Andreas Glöckner, University of Hagen and Max Planck Insti-
tute for Research on Collective Goods
OSF page: https://osf.io/3mwta/
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We collected data from a total of 212 participants, from which 
n = 188 fulfilled the inclusion criteria (complete participation, 
not missing the contribution variable, below the age limit of 34 
years) that were included in the reported analyses (time pres-
sure n = 97; forced delay n = 91). Participants were recruited 
from the social psychology subject pool at University of Göt-
tingen, Germany. Participants were paid a show-up fee of 5€ 
and were tested in groups (group size ranged from 8 to 12 in 
multiples of 4). We used the provided Qualtrics scripts with two 
changes: (a) Our study materials were translated into German, 
and (b) participants made their contributions in Euros with 
a maximum contribution for each participant of 4€. In all 
other respects, we followed the official protocol. For a differ-
ent project, after the public goods game, we measured social 
value orientation (SVO) using the 15 item SVO Slider Mea-
sure (Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011), which was 
not included in the original study. Thereby SVO was prereg-
istered and tested as potential moderator of the spontaneous 
cooperation effect.
Tess M.S. Neal, Arizona State University
Megan Warner, Arizona State University
OSF page: https://osf.io/bkmd7/
A total of 170 students were recruited from the undergradu-
ate student subject pool at Arizona State University. After we 
applied the exclusion criteria, 165 students comprised the final 
sample (time pressure n = 81; forced delay n = 79; missing 
n = 5). Most of the students were psychology majors (n = 126), 
but non-psychology majors were also allowed to participate 
(n = 39). Psychology majors were provided with 2 research 
credits in our psychology subject pool in lieu of a monetary 
show-up fee, and the non-psychology majors were provided 
a $5 show-up fee in lieu of the research credits. Participants 
were tested in groups, with groups ranging in size from 4 to 
16 (M = 9.38). As described in the “Differences From the Offi-
cial Protocol” section of our lab’s Open Science Framework 
(OSF) implementation page, we decided to run in groups that 
sometimes were not multiples of 4 given the unique constraints 
of data collection on our campus (i.e., a small subject pool 
on the ASU West Campus and a tight timeline for data collec-
tion). We altered the formula for calculating payments to cor-
respond with the number of people in the smaller groups in 
each session (further description on our OSF page). We used 
the provided Qualtrics script with one change: We created an 
additional question on the first page that asked “What is your 
computer number?” into which we could indicate the number 
affixed to the computer rather than the IP address as per the 
official protocol. This change enabled us to track an individual 
participant through the study and assign them to groups within 
the session in order to calculate payouts. In all other respects, 
we followed the official protocol.
Julie Novakova, Charles University, Prague
Petr Houdek, University of Economics, Prague
Jaroslav Flegr, Charles University, Prague
OSF page: https://osf.io/a56y4/
A total of 203 students were recruited from the subject pool 
at CEBEX Laboratory (belonging to the CEVRO Institute; how-
ever, the study was conducted by the Charles University). One 
participant in the time-pressure condition did not meet the age 
inclusion requirements, leaving 101 participants in each condi-
tion. Participants were paid a show-up fee of 50 CZK (or credits 
in case of students of classes taught at the Charles University in 
Prague and the University of Economics in Prague) and were 
tested in groups (group size ranged from 8 to 16 in multiples 
of 4). We used the provided Qualtrics scripts with the following 
changes: (a) Our study materials were translated into Czech, (b) 
participants made their contributions in Czech crowns (CZK) 
with a maximum contribution for each participant of 65 CZK, 
and (c) as all of the computers in our lab had a shared IP 
address, we added a question asking the computer’s number 
(which was visible next to each computer) so that we could 
use these instead of IP addresses in paying the participants their 
rewards. In one instance, a student had to leave just after the 
experiment had commenced. It did not disturb the other 15 par-
ticipants, so we decided to continue the session and therefore 
had an odd number of participants in the group that one time. 
In all other respects, we followed the official protocol.
Roger Pagà, Pompeu Fabra University
Gert Cornelissen, Pompeu Fabra University
Daniel Navarro-Martínez, Pompeu Fabra University
OSF page: https://osf.io/9dpjy/
A total of 157 students (time pressure n = 79; forced delay n = 78) 
were recruited from the subject pool of the Behavioral Sciences 
Laboratory (BESLab) at Pompeu Fabra University. Participants 
were paid a show-up fee of 3.50€ and were tested in groups 
(group size ranged from 12 to 28 in multiples of 4). We used 
the provided Qualtrics script with four changes: (a) Our study 
materials were translated into Spanish, (b) participants made 
their contributions in Euros with a maximum contribution for 
each participant of 2.50€, (c) two of the questions that assess 
participants’ understanding of the public goods game and that 
specifically ask participants which contributions would result 
in the maximum group and individual gains used an 11-point 
scale instead of a 9-point scale, and (d) participants were asked 
to type the ID of the computer that they used to perform the 
study. In all other respects, we followed the official protocol. 
Neither the use of a longer scale in the two comprehension 
questions mentioned above nor the inclusion of the computer 
ID question were anticipated in our preregistered plan; the lon-
ger scale was a side-effect of using Euros instead of USD; the 
closest approximation to a 9-point dollar scale from 0 cents to 
400 cents in increments of 50 cents was an 11-point Euro scale 
ranging from 0 cents to 250 cents in increments of 25 cents. 
The question asking the ID of participants’ computers had to 
be added because the Qualtrics script failed to detect the indi-
vidual IP addresses of the computers used in the study. The 
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computer IP addresses were necessary to determine the final 
payments for each participant. As the IP addresses could not be 
obtained, we were forced to replace them with an alternative 
identifier: the computer ID variable.
Marco Piovesan, University of Copenhagen
Felix S. Døssing, University of Copenhagen
Erik Wengström, Lund University
Karoline Ø. Thor, University of Copenhagen
OSF page: https://osf.io/b4ra6/
A total of 227 participants (time pressure n = 113; forced delay n = 
114) were recruited. Because we used a different currency (DKK), 
we changed the amount of possible answers in the two com-
prehension questions from nine to seven. We did this because it 
made sense to have seven possible answers going from 0 to 3000 
øre (Danish cent) with increments of 500 øre. This meant that the 
correct value in the first question was “7” rather than “9,” and this 
had to be corrected for in the data analysis scripts.
Erika Salomon, University of Illinois
Zachary Horne, University of Illinois
OSF page: https://osf.io/6j4rb/
A total of 202 participants (time pressure n = 101; forced delay 
n = 101) were recruited from the paid subject pool at University 
of Illinois. Participants were paid a show-up fee of $4.00 USD 
and were tested in groups (group size ranged from 8 to 20 in 
multiples of 4). The replication deviated from the protocol in 
the following ways. The University of Illinois Paid Subject Pool 
does not use study descriptions in its recruitment ads. Partici-
pants only saw a study number, duration, location, and mini-
mum compensation ($5.00 USD) before arriving. Therefore, the 
recruitment ad did not describe the study as a “study of deci-
sion making.” In all other respects, we followed the official pro-
tocol. In one testing session, due to a counting error, 14 rather 
than 16 participants were run at once. This was discovered at 
the conclusion of the session, and the participants in the final 
group were paid as if they had been in a four person group 
where the two missing participants had each contributed all of 
their money. As this error was not noticed until the end of the 
testing session, these participants are included in the analyses 
as required in the protocol.
Narayanan Srinivasan, University of Allahabad
Ajita Srivastava, University of Allahabad
Sumitava Mukherjee, Indian Institute of Management Ahmed-
abad
OSF page: https://osf.io/pfzkb/
A total of 204 students (time pressure n = 103; forced delay 
n = 101) were recruited from University of Allahabad and Moti-
lal Nehru National Institute of Technology, Allahabad. Partici-
pants were paid a show-up fee of 50 INR and were tested in 
groups 8, 12, or 16. We used the provided Qualtrics scripts 
with two changes: (a) Our study materials were translated into 
Hindi, and (b) participants made their contributions in Rupees 
with a maximum contribution for each participant of 80 INR. In 
all other respects, we followed the official protocol. Nine par-
ticipants were excluded from the final analysis because they did 
not enter a monetary contribution, resulting in 195 participants 
(time pressure n = 98; forced delay n = 97). After removing 
participants based on age, the final sample consisted of 177 
participants (time pressure n = 88, forced delay n = 89).
Gustav Tinghög, Linköping University
Lina Koppel, Linköping University
Magnus Johannesson, Stockholm School of Economics
Daniel Västfjäll, Linköping University & Decision Research, 
Eugene, OR
OSF page: https://osf.io/6qn3m/
A total of 168 students were recruited from the subject pool at 
Linköping University. After protocol-based exclusions, our sam-
ple for the analysis consisted of 164 students (time pressure n = 
83; forced delay n = 81). Participants were paid a show-up fee 
of 50 SEK and were tested in groups (group size ranged from 12 
to 16 in multiples of 4). We used the provided Qualtrics scripts 
with two changes: (a) Our study materials were translated into 
Swedish, and (b) participants made their contributions in SEK 
with a maximum contribution for each participant of 40 SEK. In 
all other respects, we followed the official protocol. Our study 
did not deviate from the preregistered plan.
Julian Wills, New York University
Jay J. Van Bavel, New York University
OSF page: https://osf.io/p9s2d/
A total of 148 students (time pressure n = 76; forced delay 
n = 72) were recruited from the Center of Experimental Social 
Science subject pool at New York University. Participants were 
paid a show-up fee of $5 USD and were tested in groups (group 
size ranged from 8 to 32 in multiples of 4). We used the provided 
Qualtrics scripts with two changes: (a) We added two questions 
that asked “What data collection session is this?” and “What 
computer station is this?”—these questions were answered by 
the experimenters before the participants arrived to the study, 
and (b) after completing all the measures in the protocol, par-
ticipants then completed four additional questionnaires. Our 
protocol also differed in four additional ways. First, if the num-
ber of participants who arrived were not divisible by four, then 
any remainder participants were assigned to computer stations 
at the back of the room to complete a separate task of similar 
length and pay as the one described in the protocol. Second, 
2 additional participants did not enter a contribution so their 
data were excluded before any analyses. Third, 3 participants 
were excluded because it could not be determined that they 
met the age requirements: (a) One participant reported that 
he or she was born in 1933; (b) one reported he or she was 
born in 1998; and (c) one completed the procedure at a much 
slower pace than the rest of the sample, so the experimenters 
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had to terminate the session before he/she could provide the 
year they were born. Finally, in one session, the experiment-
ers erroneously tested 14 participants. The presence of a 14th 
participant could potentially undermine the instructions about 
payments, thereby affecting performance in the task. Conse-
quently, we have excluded all data from that session (at the rec-
ommendation of the Editor who was blind to any results). Data 
from these additional participants are posted on our OSF page. 
Otherwise our procedure was exactly as stated in the protocol.
Conny E. Wollbrant, University of Gothenburg, and NTNU Busi-
ness School, Norway
Kristian Ove R. Myrseth, Trinity College Dublin
OSF page: https://osf.io/cynbz/
A total of 156 students (time pressure n = 79; forced delay n = 77) 
were recruited from the subject pool at the University of Gothen-
burg. Participants were paid a show-up fee of SEK 50 and were 
tested in groups of 8. We used the Qualtrics scripts provided, but 
with two changes: (a) Our study materials were translated into 
Swedish, and (b) participants made their contributions in SEK, 
with a maximum contribution for each participant of SEK 40. In 
all other respects, we followed the official protocol.
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Notes
1. We found the “you” versus “your” typographical error only 
after some labs had begun data collection. We decided not 
to correct the error at that stage because we did not want to 
change the procedures and we felt it would not be confusing.
2. Participants from one lab (Srinivasan) had substantially lon-
ger response times in the time-pressure condition than did 
those in all other labs, leading to more exclusions due to non-
compliance. On the OSF page, we provide the same analy-
ses excluding results from that one lab. The overall pattern of 
results does not change.
3. The result reported in the original paper excluded noncompli-
ant participants and found a 15.31 percentage point difference 
in the amount contributed between the time-pressure (M = 58%) 
and forced-delay (M = 42%) conditions.
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